

FINAL TRIP REPORT - MACEDONIA COURT SECURITY PROJECT

I. INTRODUCTION AND PROJECT SCOPE

Project Name: Macedonia Court Modernization Project

Consultant Names: Gilbert H. Skinner/Max J. Harnish

Dates of Consultancy: January 23 – February 3, 2005

Names and Dates of Counterparts met during Consultancy: Sam Juncker

Description of Consultancy:

The consultants were charged with conducting a physical security audit of selected courts, to make recommendations for security improvements in the selected courts, and to present the training curriculum for security officers and judges.

This report will be divided into three parts:

Part One will discuss the security audits,

Part Two will briefly discuss the training and issues from the training, and

Part Three will include our recommendations.

II. PART ONE: SECURITY AUDITS

In January 2005 we visited the following courts and conducted physical security audits: Gostivar, Ohrid, and Skopje II. In addition, we reviewed Struga Basic Court, having conducted an audit there in 2003. The purpose of the revisit was to review improvements made and suggest anything else that might need to be done. The consultants also made an after hours unannounced visit to the Tetovo Court.

At each court we met with selected court personnel and reviewed current practices and sought their input. The office locations were only observed during daylight hours; however, staff was asked about nighttime concerns.

The physical security audits were conducted using a security audit checklist that included the following areas:

- Exterior security – this included reviewing the property location, fences and gates, lights, landscaping, parking areas, exterior structures, utility access and any exterior security equipment.
- Building exterior – this included checking doors, windows, other openings and any exterior power facilities.
- Building interior – this review included public areas and restricted areas.
 1. Public areas included checking for any alarm systems (fire, intrusion, duress), access control (electronic, mechanical locking systems), weapons screening, courtroom security devices (bench armor, duress alarms, communication

systems), safe and vaults, utility controls, public areas, witness waiting, conference rooms and courtrooms.

2. Restricted areas included checking storage areas for weapons and dangerous substances, evidence storage, records storage, the judicial bench, judicial chambers, prisoner areas, and communication areas.
- Security staff – this included a review of staffing levels, duties and training.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS and RECOMMENDATIONS

Prior to reflecting on the security assessments of each of the selected courts there are some general observations that should be highlighted. Most of these are replicates of the concerns presented in our previous report from December 2003.

The overall goal of the Courts should be to provide fair and impartial justice in timely and safe manner. Some of the courts seemed to see security as an afterthought versus a integral part of the overall goal.

A. Administrative Concerns:

1. None of the courts had a security committee.

Discussion: Without a security committee it is very easy to allow security to become an after thought versus being in the forefront of decision-making.

Recommendation: We again recommend that each court establish a security committee that includes at a minimum: the President Judge, the Chief Security Officer and the person responsible for the physical facility (building manager). This group should establish a regular schedule for meeting, i.e. twice per year unless there has been a security incident. The committee should:

- Develop a long range security plan
- Review all security incidents
- Oversee the development of a security policy and procedures manual
- Verify emergency drills, and testing and maintenance of security and emergency equipment has been completed.
- Annually conduct a security audit.

2. None of the courts had a viable security policy and procedures manual that we were shown.

Discussion: Security policies and procedures are basic to an overall security plan. Most of the staff in the courts has some idea as to what they should do in an emergency, but all do not. In addition, policies and procedures form the basis for on-going security audits and they provide a checklist of issues that need to be

addressed. In the courts we visited there were no practiced emergency procedures. The actual practice of evacuation can save lives. The manual also should clarify authority during emergencies.

A model security plan was distributed to attendees of training we presented on this trip and we suggested at the time that this model plan be taken back to the courts and modified. One court, Gostivar, already was modifying the plan for its own purposes.

Recommendation: The courts need to adopt a model security policies and procedures manual, and then ensure that all the emergency security procedures such as evacuations are practiced at least annually. At a minimum, the manual should include specifics on:

- Various emergencies, i.e. bomb threats, fire and medical, prisoner escapes, general evacuations, natural disasters, and civil disobedience.
- Opening and closing of the court
- Alarm policies including who turns the alarms on/off
- Equipment maintenance, and
- Weapons policy which should include the weapons security may use and how as well as a clear statement of the court that no weapons are allowed in the court building.

We have also provided a court emergency procedure manual and a court officer's procedure manual. **The court officer's manual was beyond the contracted scope of work, but included because of the need by court staff.** It must be emphasized that these manuals are the beginning and not the end. All the courts need to review and modify the manuals to meet their specific conditions.

B. Perimeter Concerns

1. Courthouse grounds were often cluttered with trash and this can lead to major security problems.

Discussion: Once again the exterior audit revealed trash around the court sites. This is the age of terrorism and the planting of IED's (Improvised Explosive Devices) is easily accomplished when the court provides the hiding places for the IED. The exterior of the courts we visited all had significant amounts of trash and therefore hiding places.

Gostivar, in particular, had piles of trash around the outside of the court. This was in part due to the heavy snow and inability to remove the trash, but it needs to be noted.

Recommendation: All the exterior areas of the courts should be kept clean, *monitored daily* and reviewed for potential hiding places.

2. Restricted parking.

Discussion: Restricted and monitored parking is necessary for security. As stated previously the age of terrorism has lead to common knowledge about car bombs and the vulnerability of people and buildings. Tetovo and Struga Courts were still vulnerable, having no security at all, and the Ohrid, Gostivar and Skopje II courts were also all vulnerable. Skopje II had some availability for secured parking in an underground garage but as indicated in the previous report the security was porous at best.

Recommendation: All courts should have restricted parking that is monitored by CCTV. The restrictions can be by sign “Restricted Parking – Ticket and Tow” or secured by fencing - preferred. **Only** known court staff vehicles should be allowed to park next to the court structure.

In Gostivar and Ohrid this will mean removing all cars from the sidewalk in front of the court. For Skopje II the underground-secured parking must become just that – secured. Someone must maintain station at the doorway 24/7 if the parking is to be secure.

3. Exterior lighting was non-existent or minimal.

Discussion: While the security audit team did not have the opportunity to view the courts at night we did look for signs of exterior lighting. What we found was very little lighting and what was there was often not useful. Lighting provides a deterrent to nighttime burglary and other more serious things. Good lighting is also a safety factor for staff coming and going.

The Gostivar court had installed some outside lighting but it appeared to the consultants that the lighting was not positioned correctly. This observation was passed on the staff and we suggested they look at the lighting at night to ensure it was properly lighting the area.

Recommendation: All courts should install exterior lighting that shines down the sides of the building and extends outward to approximately the court property line. Court parking areas should all be well lighted. Lights should be set high to minimize shadow effects.

C. Interior concerns.

1. Alarms.

Discussion: The pilot courts had made great strides in their alarm systems. However, the new courts were still stuck with inadequate alarm systems. The entire alarm system approach needs to be reviewed.

Recommendations: All courts should immediately install intrusion, duress and fire alarms.

- **Intrusion alarms.** Because of the size of the courts space alarms may be the best option. However, because some of the courts are older this type of alarm may not be practical if bats or rodents inhabit the building. In those cases the alarms will have to be installed on all doors and windows readily reached from the outside. **Intrusion alarms must be installed in all evidence and records storage rooms.**
- **Duress alarms.** These are alarms designed to bring immediate help to a specific area. These alarms should be installed in all areas where money is accepted, in each courtroom, in each judicial office, in any prisoner holding area, and at the main entrance where there is weapons screening. The courts should review the response protocol for duress alarms and have a back up system to alert other police to the alarm.

The Gostivar court had a duress alarm system located at the bench. This Court needs additional alarms as indicated above.

- **Fire alarms.** All courts need to review their fire alarm systems. In all locations, signs indicating smoking was prohibited were totally ignored by court staff and citizens. **Fire alarms must be installed in all evidence and records storage areas.**

2. Access Control.

Discussion: The courts should review their locking systems and move to the most advanced system that they can afford. For the courthouse itself there should be very few people who have lock access. The courts we audited used key systems that are easily compromised. As one gets into more restricted areas the access should be limited even more (see circulation control later in this report). In addition, the courts should limit the entrances to the courthouse. All were trying to do this with various levels of success.

Recommendations: The courts should limit the number of people who have access to the building via locks. Card swipe systems (electronic access) are desirable. If possible the courts should move to biometric systems for their records and evidence rooms. **There should be only one public entrance.** All other entrances should be secured and alarmed. The court may want to have a separate entrance for judicial officers and/or prisoners.

3. Weapons' Screening.

Discussion: The screening areas generally were too small, the staffing inadequate, and the equipment ineffectively used. The area for screening was often inadequate and congested. There needs to be enough room in the screening area for people to be inside, out of the weather, while still having room to conduct the screening properly.

All the courts audited this time need to consider the use of roping and/or other techniques to use more of the lobby area for screening.

Most screening areas had enough personnel available; they were just not doing the job. Too often, when confronted with an alarm, they just allowed people to pass through versus checking them again. This was explained to the consultants as: "These are court staff"; "We have been told not to screen some people"; etc. We discussed in all the courts audited, with the President Judge, the need for everyone, including staff, to go through the magnetometer.

The walkthrough magnetometers were still being placed near or between steel doors with metal tables abutting them. This makes it impossible for the equipment to function properly.

Recommendations: Each of these recommendations must be followed if the courts are to have a weapons screening system that works.

- Each court must establish a weapons screening policy that states **everyone** must pass through the weapons screening system to enter the court. This is to include all staff. We emphasized this point with the President Judges but DPK staff will have to follow up if this is to occur.
- The court should get large signs to place both immediately outside the main entrance and then again just inside the main doors that specifically state "No weapons allowed". This was suggested in our last report and no one seems to have done it. This will help immensely and is very low cost for benefit received.
- Each court must find adequate room for placement of magnetometers and for conducting weapons screening, even if this means taking more of the public lobby and using roping to secure the area. Now that the pilot courts also have x-ray technology this is even more crucial. One court had the equipment between the two outer doors and this will eventually effect the equipment negatively.
- Each screening station **must have three people**: one to monitor the equipment, one to conduct briefcase/package searches and one to provide

an armed presence for problems. Ideally, among the three at least one would be female to handle the search issue. Even though mentioned in our last report we visited no courts that met this standard.

- The screening equipment needs to be upgraded to current standards and each court should have **at least** one handheld magnetometer for secondary screening. The pilot courts from our last visit have received equipment upgrades. Unfortunately these upgrades are ineffective unless the other recommendations are also followed.

4. Courtrooms

Discussion: Courtroom security needs to be upgraded. A basic in security is to provide a deterrent to inappropriate behavior. As part of this philosophy we are always trying to establish a “buffer” zone, i.e. either a locked door or a gate or something that will keep someone from the ability to immediately act out. Another aspect is to provide a relatively safe means of escape for the judicial officers should someone begin to act out.

The courts in Macedonia are still sadly lacking in both of these areas. In the courts we observed the court user often had “up close and personal” access to the judicial officer. In addition, if the judicial officer felt a threat there were no easy and protected means of getting to safety.

Recommendation: All courts immediately install gating that separates the public area from the judicial arena. The only people allowed in the judicial arena should be the involved parties. The judicial bench should be constructed in such a way as to offer an additional barrier and as a means of protection for the judicial officers to get to safety.

Judicial officers also often meet the court user in very small offices for first appearances. These offices offer nothing in terms of security and this practice should stop immediately. All meetings with court users should be done in either a courtroom or a specially designated office with protective barriers and means of getting to safety. This was in our last report and nothing seems to have changed in the new courts we audited.

All chairs in courtrooms should be either bolted together or secured to the floor.

5. Evidence Rooms.

Discussion: All the evidence rooms we audited this time were locked and we were not allowed access. This is a good thing.

Recommendations: Based on our interviews we believe that all the Evidence Rooms still need a basic “evidence management” policy, alarm systems – fire and intrusion, and fire suppressant systems.

6. Record Storage Rooms.

Discussion: The records storage area in 2 of the 3 courts was messy and vulnerable to theft, water damage from overhead pipes and particularly fire.

One example is the Ohrid Court where the assessment team could have used a match and a stick stuck through a broken window to destroy the court’s records.

Recommendations: All courts immediately organize and secure their records storage areas, and then install intrusion and fire alarms, as well as fire suppressant systems.

7. Utility Controls, Basements, Air conditioning, and Heating Ducts.

Discussion: These areas were very often open to the public. This makes the court vulnerable from a couple of perspectives: immediate attack (turning off the power), delayed attack (explosives being planted or someone hiding).

Recommendation: All these areas need to be secured with good locking mechanisms and in some cases may also need intrusion alarms. See recommendations below.

8. Circulation separation

Discussion: The concept of circulation separation is virtually non-existent. In other words, there is a constant crossover between the public, court staff, and judicial officers. One of the basics of security is to prevent disorder. By allowing everyone to go almost anywhere the court gives up security. While we never saw any prisoner movement within the courts we visited, we were once again informed that prisoners are also not separated from the public during transport. Anytime there is a crossover security is at risk.

Recommendations: All courts review their circulation patterns and begin to close down areas that the public has no need to access. There should be visitor waiting areas to reduce hallway congestion.

Also, all courts need to establish prisoner movement plans that may include closing down a portion of the public hallway during prisoner movement.

9. General Cleanliness.

Discussion: Just like the exterior, the interiors of most courts were also vulnerable from the trash perspective. In the Skopje II Court, one of the assessment team members found a firecracker that could have been used for a number of nefarious purposes. Smoking and cigarette butts were everywhere. This just lends to the idea the court is not well managed, i.e. if you cannot control smoking with “No Smoking” signs everywhere, what can you control.

Recommendations: All courts immediately begin a clean-up campaign to remove any litter inside and outside the courthouse. The interiors of the courts need to be kept clean, monitored daily, and litter removed from public areas.

10. Prisoner holding areas.

Discussion: We audited the holding area in Gostivar and Skopje II; there is no formal holding area in Ohrid. Proper holding areas can lead to improvement for security and staff safety. In all courts prisoners have to be lead through public hallways to get to the holding area and the courtroom. This is a big security issue because of the openness of the court.

Recommendations: All courts should establish secure prisoner holding areas. All holding areas should have video and audio monitoring capability. All furniture should be secured and any material in the area should be non-flammable. All holding areas should have walls that extend to the floor above, i.e. no drop ceilings. All holding area doors should have good locks, be solid and have a viewing port. Self-contained breathing apparatus should be available, and staff trained in their use. The courts should also consider purchasing some restraint chairs. Finally, the courts should look to some architectural redesign to get the holding areas near to secured doors and stop moving prisoners through public hallways whenever possible. In Skopje II a prisoner had actually escaped by crawling between the bars prior to a policy of leaving a police officer with all prisoners while they were in lock-up.

11. Basic Security Issues

All the courts visited by the consultants lacked some very basic things as they relate to security. Security, at some level, always goes back to basics. In the specifics of the courts audited this time we found numerous examples of little things being ignored that could lead to huge problems. For instance, in one court there was security screening, but on the 2nd and 3rd levels of the court anyone could gain access to the entire power supply and all the telephone lines. In some courts the fire hose boxes had padlocks on them which would prevent their use during a fire. Most courts had turned off some interior lights. (We were told this was a money issue but for the low cost of having a

light on or off security was compromised.) Electrical breaker boxes were immediately available to anyone thereby potentially compromising the security. Staff did not know how to check the emergency lights in some courts. In several courts we found keys left in doors or laying around, clearly a security breach. Finally, as noted above but bearing repeating, no equipment will screen people who are not required to pass through. And, no equipment can overcome staff that refuses to recheck when an alarm is sounded on the equipment.

D. Security personnel and training.

Discussion: Every court we visited was severely understaffed. The staff we did meet was often very well intentioned but most lacked basic security skills. We did have the privilege this time of having trained some staff members at courts we visited and the results showed some promises.

In observing staff conduct weapons screening it is readily apparent that they are still victims to inadequate numbers but at least in the pilot court, Gostivar, they now have the equipment to succeed. Ohrid and Skopje II are still waiting their security equipment upgrades

Recommendations: All court security providers need to have training in all areas of security. Security personnel should have appropriate security safety equipment; (bullet resistant vests) carry the same style of weapon, and have similar training. Serious consideration needs to be made of clarifying security officer authority and to the use of security officers on a 24/7 basis.

In the training, the security officers were unanimous in their agreement that clarification of their authority needs to be made. Our recommendation would be to give security officers full police powers on the court grounds and on immediate contiguous streets. In addition, we recommend the courts do away with 24/7 coverage by improving their alarm systems. The staff time saved should be re-incorporated into the working hours of the court.

E. Court staff security training.

Discussion: Staff of all the courts should receive basic security training. The staff was still one of the biggest security issues in the courts we audited. Doors were not locked, smoking was everywhere and there was a general nonchalance about security. This lack of concern is often what allows security problems to occur.

Recommendation: All court staff receives a basic course in security. The training should include, but not be limited to, the following:

- An overview of security
- Security procedures and plans
- What to do in an emergency
- First aid
- Dealing with angry and disgruntled people
- What to do if attacked
- Security to and from work

SECURITY ISSUES FOR THE SPECIFIC COURT LOCATIONS

This section will identify key security issues and security recommendations for the courts visited by the assessment team.

GOSTIVAR BASIC COURT

This is a pilot court project so they had revamped courtrooms with duress alarm systems, better locks, and more modern equipment for entry screening. That said, this building is in a high-density area. The building location lends itself to security problems, because there is little to no available parking. **The court should consider moving out of this location.**

The following are the major security issues found at this location, which were not part of the observations discussed above or need particular emphasis.

Building Perimeter

The parking is poor. The parking is so limited that vehicles are parked directly in front of the main entrance to the court as well as on the sidewalk in front of the court building. All of these vehicles offer the threat of a car bomb, or cover for an assailant. **Recommendation:** The front area of the court needs to have no parking and cement barricades should be used to block vehicle access to the front entrance. Cars parked around the court should be kept as far away as possible and limited in number.

Building Exterior

The building is not secure in the evening hours. Even though there is security staff on duty 24/7 the building cannot be called secure in the evening. As noted above, during the evening the Tetovo security personnel place themselves in a small interior office and wait for the morning. This is due to the fact that in the past when they were making rounds they were fired upon from outside. The bullet holes are still visible. **Recommendation:** With the addition of external lighting, intrusion and fire alarms that ring to a security station, the on-premises security can be stopped. The bullet holes should be immediately fixed.

Building Interior

The Prisoner Holding area was insufficient. Currently the court uses a room that was someone's office. There is old furniture, file cabinets, etc in the room. Even though the officers stay with the prisoner this is inadequate. **Recommendation:** The court should have a proper prisoner holding area.

Entry screening is still an issue. Even with new equipment court officers routinely allowed people to pass through who had set off an alarm. The screening area is also very small and the court needs to think about a way for people to exit without going back through the magnetometer. **Recommendation:** The court review and/or establish its policy on screening and ensure everyone follows the policy.

SKOPJE II BASIC COURT

This court is located in downtown Skopje and is in the same building complex as the Supreme Court.

The following are specific security issues found at this location, which were not part of the observations discussed above or need particular emphasis..

Building Perimeter

There is an exterior power source that is unsecured. Recommendation: This power source should be secured.

A light chain fence is the only barrier to stop vehicle access to the court, i.e. car bomb. Recommendation: The Court should consider concrete barriers between it and the roadway.

Other openings are prevalent around the court and several of these were unsecured. Recommendation: The court needs to secure all other openings.

Building Interior

The Staff Door for entrance to the court. This door is located off of a common porch with the Supreme Court, i.e. it may draw traffic just because of its location. During the visit the Court secretary said that the doorway was secured after 9:00 a.m. and prior to that time monitored by an officer. We found the door unsecured and no officer present. **Recommendation:** This door needs to have an alarm installed that is activated as the officer leaves.

First floor door between Skopje II and the Supreme Court needs to be secured. This door is used by staff to go back and forth to the Supreme Court and used to have a security lock. Now it is just left open. Unfortunately this area is also by the public restrooms for the Supreme Court and someone could easily gain access to the back of Skopje II court by just walking in. **Recommendation:** The door needs to be secured and thought given to a card access system so employees do not compromise the system.

Power supply and telephone line access. On two floors of the court, over on the Supreme Court side of the building, there were power supply and telephone line closets that were open, and in an area where staff could not easily monitor them. With little to no effort a person could shut down the court for hours if not days. **Recommendation:** These closets need to have quality locks placed on them and intrusion alarms should be considered.

Entry screening is an issue. This is to be a new pilot court but even now court officers routinely allowed people to pass through who had set off an alarm. The screening area is sufficient but the court needs to think about a way for people to exit without going back through the screening area. **Recommendation:** The court review and/or establish its policy on screening and ensure everyone follows the policy.

Fire hoses. All the fire hose cabinets were locked. This was explained as a security measure to prevent people from turning on the hoses. This policy is a direct violation of good security. If a fire ever broke out trying to find someone with the key and then actually being able to use it in smoke is a scary idea. **Recommendation:** All locks be removed from the fire hose cabinets and if the court is truly concerned all cabinets can be set with an intrusion alarm to sound when opened.

OHRID BASIC COURT

This court is located in downtown Ohrid and is boxed in on two sides by other buildings. The building is older and in need of major maintenance. The roof of the front porch area is falling down and there were numerous broken windows that need to be replaced.

Building Perimeter

Because of its location, parking is a premium. Recommendation: The court will need to erect cement barriers to keep vehicles from getting too close to the building. All vehicles should be kept from parking on the entry walkway.

Exterior lighting. Two new lights have been added to the back of the building but they should be examined at night to see the exact coverage. **Recommendation:** Add one more light to the back and check coverage.

Windows. As indicated above several windows are broken. One window that leads to the records storage area has a hole in it. Someone could easily light a stick, put it through the broken window and start a major fire. **Recommendation:** All broken windows need to be repaired.

Porch Ceiling. The porch ceiling is falling. This risk is now most prevalent on the corner of the porch, but looks to be spreading. If it continues everyone trying to pass into the court may be at risk. **Recommendation:** The ceiling must be repaired.

Building Interior

Weapon Screening Area. This is a congested area (right by a courtroom) and is very narrow. Officers also allow people to pass through that have set off alarms. **Recommendation:** As new equipment is added the court should examine alternative ways of setting up the screening area by using more of the front entry area. If there is going to be work done on the ceiling, see above, this may present opportunities to move the front doorway out more and give greater area for screening. The court also needs to establish its screening policy which should include everyone passes through and any alarms need to be resolved before the person can enter the court.

Courtrooms. None of the courtrooms have a barrier separating the public area from the judicial area. **Recommendation:** Some type of barrier which can be as simple as roping should be used to separate the public and judicial arenas.

STRUGA BASIC COURT

We audited this court in December 2003. Since then the court has finalized construction and has had a number of security upgrades. The major issue for the court currently is a street that is being rerouted to pass directly in front of the building. This is totally contrary to all security, particularly in light of the fact that this court earlier had been bombed. **Recommendation: Anything that can be done to prevent this street rerouting should be done.** Otherwise all the security upgrades will have little meaning.

There were some additional areas discussed with staff, such as: closing off the area around weapon screening to prevent people from being able to bypass the system, securing electrical breakers, installing some mirrors for concealed areas, repositioning one courtroom so that the judicial officer's backs are not towards a window, and

adding a light and alarms at the back of the court building by the access door to the power plant.

TETOVO BASIC COURT

This was an additional visit requested by the consultants to review an August bombing near the court. We arrived after hours and found the court open, no security present and the new court equipment vulnerable. A call was made by a cleaning person and security arrived after about 10 minutes. **Recommendation:** The myth of 24/7 security was amply demonstrated. The court must move the equipment from between the doors and further back into the main entry. The court should also consider using alarms for after court hour security and reassign the court officers to working only when court is in session.

SECURITY NEEDS

There are many things the courts can do to dramatically increase security with minimal dollars, i.e. clean areas up, implement a security committee, revise and use the attached emergency and security procedures manuals, practice the emergency plans and continue efforts to raise staff awareness.

There are however, also some very critical needs that will take time and must be addressed, such as clarification of officers authority, and the question of why have 24/7 staff coverage of the courts when alarms can do a better job and staff can be redirected to the courts regular hours where they can provide more security.

All the needs identified in our previous report need to continue as priorities but we need to add the issues listed above.

III. COURT SECURITY TRAINING

Two separate training sessions were presented: the first was to the Court officers and lasted two days, the second was for President Judges and Court Secretaries and this session was one day in length. The topics were as follows:

- Court Officers
 1. Court security: Prevention and Assessment
 2. Court Security Officer Duties
 3. Judicial protection
 4. Personnel, Policies and procedures
- President Judges and Court Secretaries
 1. Court security: Prevention and Assessment
 2. Judicial protection
 3. Personnel, Policies and procedures

There were 22 participants in the Court officers program and there were 37 people scheduled for the President Judges program. The immediate feedback was that participants in both programs found the content and presentation excellent. Written feedback was given to DPK but has not as yet been shared with the consultants.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

Besides recommendations listed above we offer the following:

- A. **More training.** The two-day training was not enough time. Officers had limited opportunity to actually do things which always enhances training. In addition, all the court officers from at least the pilot courts need to attend the same type of training.

Court training for the rest of the court staff needs to remain a priority. Given that the courts have limited resources, attuning the court staff to security issues provides another level of security not currently present. A sample training curriculum is listed above in this report.

- B. **Equipment use.** There has to be a strong stand taken that the new equipment provided under this project is used, is used correctly, and maintained properly. We noted the Tetovo experience above and feel this may be more the norm than the exception. All courts should also have as part of the granting of equipment the requirement to require everyone to pass through. Otherwise the entire screening system is compromised. Courts not in compliance need to realize they could lose the equipment.

- C. **Clarify court officer authority.** One of the biggest concerns of the court security police was clarification of their authority. Our recommendation is to facilitate the court officers being given full police authority on the court grounds and contiguous streets. This is necessary to adequately provide security to the courts. One example is the night we arrived and were going to our hotel we observed a gasoline tanker truck sitting in front of the Skopje Courts. When we mentioned this the next day in class the court officers said they would have no authority to order the truck to leave. This is clearly unacceptable. This may require a change in hiring practices and more training to meet police certification but it is a step that should be pursued.

- D. **The concept of 24/7 staffing should be reviewed.** See our comments in the Tetovo section but also consider that alarms in the long run are cheaper and in many cases better for just securing the building. The staffing is desperately needed in the day and this is a cultural issue that should be addressed.

- E. **Focus on the basics.** Too often we found the basics ignored at the courts. For instance, unlocked doors that should have been locked, circuit breakers exposed, closets leading to power and telephones unlocked, fire hoses locked, trash left around (in one court we found a pile of bricks left right in an area for the public), smoking everywhere with “No Smoking” signs very visible. These are the things that speak to an unmanaged court, i.e. a court that someone intent on harming sees as an opportunity. The mantra of the professional is never forget the basics.
- F. **Follow-up assistance.** The courts are going to need continued follow up. This means everything from occasional nighttime visits to check security, to assistance on maintaining accuracy on recognizing devices with the x-ray. Long-term, the courts may want to establish an overall security person who provides these services.